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Correctly determining witness credibility is integral to a fair trial. Assessments of credibility 
by the triers of fact are made, inter alia, by reference to behavioural stereotypes that are 
commonly thought to be associated with lying and truth telling.  These stereotypes are 
worthless but pervasive. In this study, venire jurors were given information such as would be 
given by way of judicial direction and/or expert testimony on those behavioural indicia that 
are useful in detecting deception. Major changes in venire juror perceptions of what does and 
does not work were found. This has significant implications for the conduct of criminal trials. 
Recommendations are presented which, it is argued, can be of real, practical assistance in 
enabling decision makers to assess the credibility of witnesses. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Objective and Perceived Truth 
A trial is an attempt to recreate the past. It involves the presentation and assessment of 
physical evidence and what may be referred to as memory-trace evidence from eyewitnesses 
that the triers of fact assess to determine the truth of competing claims. Truth, however, is a 
somewhat elusive concept and it is necessary to discriminate between perceived and objective 
truth, as a yawning gulf can exist between them. For example, a common and particularly 
virulent problem in forensic contexts leading to false perceptions of the truth is post-event 
contamination of memory, which results in false memories. Thus, a witness can be truthful 
but nonetheless mistaken. Although the courts have long recognised the potential for 
prejudice and bias that can occur in eyewitness evidence, attempts to remedy this situation 
have been limited to giving judicial directions and exhorting jurors to apply their common 
sense, ill-defined though this is, and their life experiences (Coyle, Field & Miller, 2008). 
 
Prejudice and bias in eyewitness evidence are not the only problems to infect the curial 
processes. To be sure, there are many other elements of psychology which affect the 
perception of truth that are much more subtle and require considerable scientific expertise to 
discern. In many cases, the gap between objective and perceived truth is not so much a 
yawning gulf as a pygmy strait, but the effect is the same. For example, cognitive biases and 
heuristics affect our capacity to comprehend statistical information routinely presented in 
trials involving DNA, latent fingerprint evidence and actuarial information on risk of 
recidivism. It has been conclusively demonstrated that perceptions of the truth and objective, 
mathematical, determination of the truth are often very far apart in such cases (Tversky & 
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Khaneman, 1974; Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). This quintessential element of being human 
is inimical to the course of justice, yet it has received virtually no attention from the superior 
courts. 
 
Determining when and how perception, memory and cognition can be affected so as to lead to 
confusion between perceptions of truth and objective truth involves the study of human 
behaviour, which is the domain of psychologists. Yet there has been great reluctance to 
adduce the evidence of psychologists when it is perceived as trespassing upon the finality rule 
in relation to collateral issues. At the risk of simplification, this rule deals with matters solely 
going to the credit of a witness.  The rule arose so as to impose some sort of reasonable time 
limits on court proceedings.
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Justice McClellan (2006) made one of the bluntest judicial observations on this point when, in 
commenting about psychology, common sense and the law, he noted [at paragraph 19]:  
 
Law and psychology can be uneasy partners. The law has traditionally devised 
its own rules of human behaviour and created its own norms for interpreting 
that behaviour. Informed by little more than the appellate court‟s 
understanding and often classified under the rubric of “common sense” judges 
are required to direct jurors in a particular manner on a whole range of 
subjects, with varying degrees of impact on the outcome of the trial – some 
more easily identifiable than others. 
 
Juror’s Assessment of Human Behaviour 
For over two centuries the observations of Lord Mansfield in Folkes v Chadd  (1782) have 
stood sentinel to the capacity of juries to discharge their fact-finding functions without the 
assistance of expert opinion in matters of human behaviour. Therein it was noted:  
 
The fact that an expert witness has impressive scientific qualifications does not 
by that fact alone make his opinion on matters of human behaviour within the 
limits of normality any more helpful than that of jurors themselves; but there is 
a danger that they may think it does. 
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Despite the undoubted advances in medicine and the behavioural sciences that have occurred 
since Folkes v Chadd, the thrust of this opinion still exerts influence on judicial thinking. 
Thus, Lawton LJ in R v Turner (1975), reading the unanimous judgment of the English Court 
of Appeal, noted [at 843] that: “psychiatry has not yet become a satisfactory substitute for the 
common sense of juries…within their experience of life.”  
 
This, and similar judicial utterances over the years, suggest that juries are empanelled in the 
belief that they bring with them into the criminal justice process an awareness of normal 
human weakness – whether physical or mental – and the usual consequences of the 
vicissitudes of everyday life.  Equally, it has been acknowledged that human behaviour 
outside the “limits of normality” is an area in which jurors without the benefit of academic 
qualifications in the behavioural/mental health sciences most certainly will require assistance 
from someone who has. In Murphy v The Queen (1989), in which the issue was whether or 
not certain words and phrases used in a contested confession were consistent with those of a 
person who, like M, had an intellectual age of ten, it was held per Deane J [at 126], that the 
expert evidence was admissible on that issue, since: “ no-one but an expert could properly 
give evidence grading [the accused‟s] level of intellectual functioning…Certainly, the 
ordinary juror would lack the specialised knowledge and experience.” 
 
The problem areas are to be found within these two extremes, and most of them concern areas 
of human behaviour that are well within the specialised fields of study of behavioural 
scientists, but are also arguably contained within normal life experience, and therefore require 
no scientific elaboration to assist the jury in their fact-finding function. One such area is what 
might be termed behavioural assessment of witness credibility.  
 
Witness credibility  
One “life experience” topic that has straddled the threshold of expert evidence admissibility 
for many years is that of witness credibility, a matter traditionally regarded as the sole 
province of the jury in a criminal trial.  The historical, and still orthodox, position was best 
expressed in the majority opinion of the Canadian Supreme Court in R v Marquard (1993) 
held [at 228] that: 
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It is a fundamental axiom of our trial process that the ultimate conclusion as to 
the credibility or truthfulness of a particular witness is for the trier of fact, and 
is not the proper subject of expert opinion. 
 
It is conventional legal wisdom in Australia (see, for example, R v Martens (2007) that this 
arrangement presents no difficulty, since “witness demeanour” is something that can be safely 
left to a jury where there is no reason to suspect that the witness is in any way different from 
his or her fellow citizens.  It is, after all, the very “normality” of a jury that is being called in 
aid to assess the believability of one of their peers, and this is one of the main arguments in 
favour of jury trial (Connor, 1987). 
 
However, if – unknown to the jury – there are factors present which ought to be taken into 
account before assessing whether or not a witness should be believed, then should that jury 
not be advised of those factors?  After all, evidence regarding provable witness bias, and a 




In R v BDX (2009) the Victorian Court of Appeal held, in a trial for incest in which the 
credibility of the victim was the central issue in the case, that the defence should have been 
allowed to adduce the evidence of a former employer of hers, to the effect that she “wouldn‟t 
believe a word she said”, even on oath.  This revived a common law exception to the 
“collateral issues” rule that many observers had come to believe had fallen into disuse. The 
witness who was allowed to testify in that case was not an “expert” in the professional sense, 
but someone who knew the witness very well.  While this made her “an expert by experience” 
in the matter to which she was testifying, this fell a long way short of authorising such 
evidence being given by an expert with relevant qualifications.  
 
In Aytugrul v The Queen (2012) Heydon J neatly encapsulated the seminal issues involved in 
having the superior courts attempt to deal with expert psychological evidence at appeal 
without such evidence being adduced at trial. The appeal involved issues of expert statistical 
knowledge and the effect on juror‟s perceptions of the evidence based on the manner in which 
the statistics were presented as to the frequency of a particular type of mitochondrial DNA in 
various populations. The manner in which statistical evidence is presented has been the 
subject of significant psychological research and judicial observations in the various countries 
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that have embraced the common law (Coyle & Halon, 2013). In Aytugrul, His Honour 
commented as follows [at paragraph 71-citations have been inserted]: 
 
Works on psychology have been considered in formulating rules about 
identification evidence (Winmar v Western Australia [2007] WASCA 244; 
(2007) 35 WAR at 167 and 171-172) both directly (Smith v The Queen [2011] 
HCA 50; (2001) 206 CLR 650 at 667-668) and indirectly (The People 
(Attorney-General) v Casey (No 2) [1963] IR 33 at 39; R v Gaunt [1964] 
NSWR 864 at 866). This is not surprising, since the court's recognition of the 
"inherent frailties of identification evidence" has been said to arise "from the 
psychological fact of the unreliability of human observation and recollection (R 
v Sutton [1970] 2 OR 358 at 368 per Jessup JA (Gale CJO and Kelly JA 
concurring), approved in Alexander v The Queen [1981] HCA 17; (1981) 145 
CLR 395 at 435).   If frailty rests on a psychological fact, and on psychological 
research (Pollitt v The Queen (2001) HCA35; (1992) 174 CLR 558 at 615), 
expert material bearing on the psychological fact must have potential 
significance (emphasis added). Works on psychiatry have also been considered 
in explaining why children delay in complaining of sexual assault in relation to 
the unsafe and unsatisfactory ground of criminal appeal (Jones v The Queen 
(1997) 191 CLR 439 at 463; [1997] HCA 56)…Psychiatric studies on the harm 
suffered by child victims of sexual offences have been taken into account in 
developing sentencing principles (Ryan v The Queen (2001) 206 CLR 267 at 
281;  [2001] HCA 21)  … 
His Honour then went on [at paragraph 74] to note that if expert evidence:  
 
…were to be taken into account, it was highly preferable that it be presented 
through expert witnesses, preferably during a pre-trial hearing to determine 
admissibility. The admissibility and weight of the expert material could then be 
considered publicly and critically. 
 
Without explicitly commenting upon cognitive heuristics such as framing bias (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1974), which affects judgment under conditions of uncertainty (an issue that was 
exquisitely relevant to the matters raised in Aytugrul v The Queen), it is impossible to 
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properly ascertain the weight, if any, that should be given to expert evidence such as those 
that were the subject of His Honour‟s reflections. A proper assessment of the weight that 
should be afforded to expert evidence on this topic involves complex issues of psychology 
and epistemology as they apply to the finality rule in relation to collateral issues. 
Acknowledging this, the decision in Aytugrul v The Queen clearly leaves the door open for 
expert psychological evidence dealing with psychological facts of all kinds to be adduced in 
evidence. In what follows, psychological facts are considered as they apply to the vexed issue 
of witness credibility and detection of deception. 
 
Witness Demeanour & Witness Credibility 
The demeanour of witnesses is a fundamental issue in the assessment of credibility. Although 
the law is far from settled on this in Australia,
4
 it is considered axiomatic that triers of fact 
can, and should, consider witness demeanour. In practice, this means attending to verbal and 
non-verbal indicia of truthfulness, in addition to considering collateral information that may 
refute or confirm a witnesses‟ recollection. In many cases, where competing versions of 
events are given, the assessment of such indicia are of great import: sometimes it may be the 
only basis on which a decision can be arrived at. Legal training and experience confers no 
special benefit in detecting deception in forensic contexts. There is no compelling evidence 
which proves that lawyers generally, and judges in particular, operate at anything better than 
chance level when detecting truthfulness, although there is a danger that they may think 
otherwise. And there is an abundance of evidence that jurors attend to unreliable indicia of 
deception when making their decisions.  
 
In commenting on the problems recognised by the common law of the injustices that have 
arisen from the large number of “exceptions” to the rules of evidence, Bagaric and McConvill 
(2005) have made the pungent observation [at 12]: 
 
We also need rules of evidence to be based not on the intuition of lawyers, but 
rather on the knowledge of experts in the area. We should be listening to 
behavioural scientists, not more lawyers - they are the ones that got us into this 
hole in the first place. 
 
This observation is supported, albeit obliquely, in the Equal Treatment Benchbook of the 
Supreme Court of Queensland wherein, in relation to the putative problems associated with 
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respect of cultural misunderstanding of witnesses‟ responses [at 76] it is opined that: 
 
It may be necessary to receive expert evidence in this regard. The areas of 
potential misunderstanding are likely to include, politeness, body language, 
power dynamics, metalinguistic factors such as pitch, volume and silence.  
 
This holds out the prospect of relief from the reluctance of the courts to allow such evidence 
to be adduced: this prospect is a chimera. The thrust of the Equal Treatment Benchbook 
serves to exclude the reception of expert evidence in such matters for Anglo-Australians.
5
 
Although it may be an unintended consequence, Anglo-Australians, as will be apparent in 
what follows, seem not to be afforded the same consideration given to those of different 
ethnicity.  
 
What is to be done to overcome such a state of affairs? One way forward has been suggested 
by Bagaric and McConvill (2005) who propose [at 25] that:  
 
Consideration should be given to having an expert in behavioural science 
observe the trial process and give expert evidence on the veracity of witnesses. 
This can only be evaluated by undertaking controlled experiments during mock 
trials. 
 
There are numerous problems associated with this proposal. For a start, in those jurisdictions 
that have enacted the Uniform Evidence Laws expert evidence as to the credibility of a 
witness may only be adduced with the leave of the court: this is by no means guaranteed (see, 
generally, Coyle, Field, Wilson, Cuthbert & Miller, 2009). In other jurisdictions, the situation 
is far less certain. It is recognised that section 108(c) of the Uniform Evidence Law allows, in 
the Commonwealth and those states which have enacted this legislation, expert evidence to be 
given to as to the credibility of a witness, with the consent of the court. The difficultly is, even 
where the Uniform Evidence Law is applicable, that such evidence should not, as Kirby J 
noted in Farrell v The Queen (1998) “seek to usurp the decision-makers ultimate assessment 
of the credibility of the witness” (for discussion see: Coyle, Field, Wilson, Cuthbert & Miller, 
2009).  
 
There are also practical problems with having an expert comment on the veracity of 
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witnesses‟ evidence given during a trial. Nonetheless, considering the thrust of decision in 
Aytugrul v The Queen, an expert could, at the very least, give evidence to assist decision 
makers as to reliable indicia of truthfulness/deception so as to assist them in their 
deliberations, without necessarily venturing an opinion as to the credibility of any particular 
witness.  
 
Witness Demeanour and the Detection of Deception 
The detection of deception in forensic contexts has been the subject of voluminous research 
and many of the characteristics of witnesses‟ demeanour that decision makers can be expected 
to attend to have been the subject of extensive research. This research, and the consensus of 
scientific knowledge that has developed flowing from this research have been almost 
completely ignored by the law. 
 
Thus, in the Equal Treatment Benchbook of the Queensland Supreme Court (2006) [at p.75] it 
is stated that: 
 
An impressive witness according to Anglo-Australian culture will look his or 
her questioner in the eye and answer questions confidently and clearly. In other 
cultures, however, direct eye contact maybe considered rude and challenging... 
such responses may be misunderstood as demonstrating evasiveness or 
shiftiness on the part of the witness."  
 
This unqualified assertion is spoiled by an inconvenient fact: gaze aversion is the most 
unreliable indicator of deception in all countries that have been studied. This misconception 
it is not unique to English speakers. In a comprehensive, worldwide study (The Global 
Deception Research Team, 2006), of 2,520 lifelong residents of 63 countries, 71.5% believed 
that gaze aversion was a reliable indicator of lying. It is, therefore, not surprising that mock 
jurors are more likely to perceive that expert witnesses, particularly if they are male, have 
greater credibility if they maintain high levels of eye contact (Neal & Brodsky, 2008).  
 
Techniques for Detecting Deception 
Given the importance of evaluating the credibility of witnesses‟ statements, specific 
techniques have been developed to assess the validity of claims (Fritzon, 2005; Köhnken, 
2004; Raskin & Esplin, 1992).  These may be grouped under three main types (Vrij, 2000; 
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2008). First, observing how people behave: the movements they make gaze aversion, 
stuttering, their pitch of voice and so on. Second, measuring physiological responses such as 
the galvanic skin response, which is one of the physiological indicia measured by polygraphs. 
Third, analysing the speech content.  
 
Measuring putative physiological indicia of lying is obviously not an option for jurors, or 
experts for that matter, during the course of a trial, neglecting the controversy that surrounds 
this approach generally and more specifically in the Australian forensic context. The 
exception to this general statement is the possible utility of measuring the pitch of a 
witnesses‟ voice relative to baseline performance when they are giving evidence (Vilar, 
Arciuili & Paterson, 2013). However, this too has significant practical difficulties. The formal 
analysis of speech content is not an option for jurors, albeit that various methods of speech 
analysis are commonly used in other jurisdictions and, at the very least, hold great promise 
(Memom, Fraser, Colwell, Odinot & Mastroberadino, 2010; Sporer, 2004; Vrij, 2005).
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Accordingly, for all practical purposes, the only validated technique that can be employed by 
decision makers during the course of a trial in assessing witness credibility is to consider 
those behavioural indicia that are indicative of lying/truth telling and consider the plausibility 
of the answers given, particularly in the context of collateral information from other 
witnesses. 
 
Behavioural Indicia of Lying and Truth Telling 
Apart from gaze aversion, other global, pan-cultural, stereotypes of lying included the 
entrenched beliefs that liars shift posture (65.2%), touch and scratch themselves (64.8%) and 
tell longer stories than usual (62.2%). None of these stereotypes are accurate (The Global 
Deception Research Team, 2006). More generally, a very significant proportion of 
laypersons‟ and professionals‟ beliefs about non-verbal and verbal cues to deception have 
been repeatedly demonstrated to be incorrect (De Paulo, Lindsay, Malone, Muhlenbruck, 
Charlton & Cooper, 2003; Mann, Vrij & Bull 2004; Mann & Vrij, 2006). Apart from the 
ubiquity of gaze aversion, frequent blinking, fidgeting with objects or self, self-grooming, 
shifting posture, rate of speaking and brow lowering, none of these indicia are reliable 
indicators of lying.  
 
Spontaneous corrections and admitting lack of memory are negatively correlated with lying, 
which is contrary to commonly held beliefs. That is, in ordinary conversation when people 
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recall events they tell them in a way that is not perfect. They might start to tell a story then 
realise they have forgotten something and go back and correct themselves. These are signs of 
credibility. In essence, a significant proportion of cues to lying are counter-intuitive for most 
laypeople, and for many professionals for that matter. This is especially so for non-verbal 
behaviour (Bond Jr et al., 2006; De Paulo et al., 2003).  
 
It is not only judges who typically operate at chance level in detecting lying. There is no 
evidence whatsoever that suggests that police officers, other criminal investigators, social 
workers or child care workers are better at detecting untruthful/incorrect answers in forensic 
contexts than anyone else (Porter & ten Brinke, 2012; Vrij, Mann, Robbins & Robinson, 
2006). Typically, these groups also perform at about chance level when trying to determine 
whether an individual is truthfully recalling something the individual claims to have observed 
or experienced if they rely on unstructured judgment. The more experienced they are the more 
confident they feel in their assessment but this confidence is entirely unsupported by 
evidence. For example, there is evidence that police officers tend to over-emphasise non-
verbal cues at the expense of more reliable indicators of lying such as changes in pitch, 
hesitation and speech error and micro-momentary facial expressions of emotion (Bull, 2004; 
O‟Sullivan & Ekman, 2004). 
 
As far as observing behaviour is concerned, there are some reliable indicators of truthful 
recall, such as change in pitch of voice, time taken to respond to questions and frequency of 
hand movements designed to illustrate or supplement verbal utterances (De Paulo et al., 2003; 
Mann et al., 2004; 2006; Vrig, 2008). To reiterate, gaze aversion, which is often thought to be 
a reliable indicator of lying is not, in fact, a good indicator of lying; nor are excessive finger 
and hand movements. Conversely, lack of body movements is a good indicator of lying. This 
deserves some explanation since it appears counter-intuitive. The reason is that because 
telling lies is more cognitively intensive than truth telling, liars minimise extraneous 
movements so as to concentrate on the lies they are presenting. 
 
The problem with attempting to determine some the behavioural indicia that are diagnostic of 
lying/truth telling in the forensic context is simple: courtroom design, or the lack thereof. The 
design of many courtrooms does not permit the triers of fact to see the witness with sufficient 
clarity to be able to observe minor movements of the facial features, which can be a good 
indicator of deception according to some authors. Further, other indicators of deception (such 
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as lack of movement of the feet) simply cannot be observed at all due to the design of the 
witness box. In fact, in many courts, the jurors and judge can only see a side profile of the 
witness.  
 
That said, the most reliable general non-verbal and verbal indicators of lying, as distinct from 
nervousness, which is often conflated with lying, are as follows (De Paulo et al., 2003; 
Strömwall, Granhag & Hartwig, 2004; Vrij, 2008; Vrij, Granhag & Porter, 2010; Vilar, et al., 
2013):  
 Liars tend to speak in a higher pitch relative to baseline performance. 
 Liars make fewer movements with hands/arms/fingers. 
 Liars use fewer illustrators (hand and arm movements to demonstrate and illustrate 
points they are making). 
 Liars take longer pauses. 
 Liars make fewer movements with their hands and feet. 
 Liars‟ answers are less plausible. 
 Liars‟ stories contain fewer details. 
 Liars give more indirect answers. 
 Liars contain less temporal, perceptual and spatial information. 
 Liars make fewer spontaneous corrections. 
 
It needs to be emphasised that, in the absence of compelling collateral information that 
disproves a version of events, there is no one indicator of lying that is universally accurate. 
That is, there is no such thing as Pinocchio‟s nose.  
 
Although there is general consensus in the literature that the behavioural indicia iterated 
above are reliable, there remains the problem of determining the baseline, or usual behaviour, 
of individuals when they are telling the truth. After all, it is departure from individuals‟ usual 
behaviour when they are telling the truth that enables observers to detect when someone is 
lying insofar as they rely upon behavioural indicia. Thus, it is easier to detect if someone well 
known to the observer is lying as opposed to a stranger because departure from their usual 
mannerisms/ behavioural indicia can be compared to those present when lying was not an 
issue.  For example, it is within common experience that some individuals will naturally 
speak in a higher pitched voice than others. If an individual‟s typical speech pattern is well 
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known to an observer it is far easier to detect departures from their normal pitch of speaking 
than if this is not known. Inter alia, this is why it is far easier for parent‟s to determine if their 
children are lying than complete strangers. 
 
Training in Detecting Deception and Truth-Telling 
Summarising studies of training in typical interrogation deception detection, Reidlich and 
Meissner (2009) observed [at 126] that: 
 
Even professionals who have to make daily decisions of whether people are lying 
do not demonstrate high rates of accuracy when detecting deception (Meissner & 
Kassin, 2002; O‟Sullivan & Ekman, 2004). Indeed, training on typical 
interrogation deception detection techniques has been shown to have a deleterious 
effect on accuracy (Kassin & Fong, 1999; Meissner & Kassin, 2002; see also, 
Bond & DePaulo, 2006). That is, studies with college students and police officers 
found that trained participants were less accurate than naïve participants, but were 
nevertheless significantly more confident in their abilities to detect deception. 
 
While a significant proportion of studies where training has been given in detecting 
behavioural indicia indicative of lying and truth telling have failed to demonstrate robust 
results, this does not prove that such training and/or education is doomed to fail. The most 
parsimonious explanation for this failure to improve detection of deception is training in the 
wrong techniques (Frank & Feeley, 2003). Even the most cursory review of many police 
training manuals, for example, demonstrates glaring errors in so-called deception training and 
interview techniques. The Reid Technique, which has been employed for decades in the USA 
in various iterations, is but one of a number of  egregious examples (Inbau, Reid & Buckley, 
1986) that fail to take into account fundamental psychological principles involved in 
interrogation and/or detection of deception, as has been commented on by  Gudjonnson 
(1992) and others. 
 
Then there is the problem that the detection of deception is intrinsically difficult. Humans 
have evolved to lie and lies have social benefit in many situations: imagine a world without 
any lies, however well intentioned, for a moment. While humans have also evolved to detect 
lies, the contest between liars and those seeking to catch out the liars is fraught with 
difficulties. Hartwig and Bond Jr (2011) argue that the failure to reliably detect lies is not 
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because people rely on the wrong cues, but it is attributable to the weakness of behavioural 
cues to deception. These authors may well be correct in saying that the behavioural 
differences between liars and truth-tellers are small but it does not proceed from this that 
inability to disciminate between liars and truth-tellers is due solely to inability to detect small 
differences in relevant behavioural indicia. For example, it has been demonstrated that 
observers can reliably detect behavioural differences between liars and truth-tellers and that 
they can make accurate veracity judgements on such observed differences (Vrij, Akehurst, 
Soukara & Bull, 2006). In addition, it has been repeatedly demonstrated that poor accuracy in 
discriminating liars from truth-tellers is largely due to individuals paying attention to 
behavioural indicia that are not diagnostic of deception, such as gaze aversion (Hartwig et al., 
2004; Kassin & Fong, 1999; Mann et al., 2004; Vrij & Mann, 2001). 
 
It proceeds from this, that one way of improving the detection of deception is to improve the 
abilities of triers of fact to discriminate between liars and truth tellers. There is a number of 
ways in which this can be achieved, such as increasing the cognitive workload of the 
suspected liar, which would be expected to increase the frequency of behavioural indicia 
which are associated with deception (Vrij, Mann et al., 2010; Warmelink, Vrij, Mann, Leal & 
Poletiek, 2013). Most of these are unlikely to be of any great value in a courtroom for the 
triers of fact, unless they were very well trained indeed. Having said this, after participants 
were given instruction vis-à-vis behavioural cues that are diagnostic and non-diagnostic of 
deception and/or undertook some practise/feedback tasks (Porter, McCabe, Woodworth & 
Pearce, 2007; Porter, Juodis, ten Brinke, Klein & Pearce, 2010) their discrimination between 
liars and truth tellers improved significantly. This, then, is worthy of investigation with venire 
jurors, insofar as it has practical and theoretical implications both from a forensic 
psychological and jurisprudence perspective. 
 
Judicial Directions and Expert Evidence on Detecting Deception and Truth Telling 
It is an article of faith amongst the judiciary that properly framed judicial directions are 
capable of effectively educating jurors on many topics. The evidence does not support this 
entrenched belief; jurors‟ comprehension of judicial instructions is generally poor 
(Blankenship, Luginbuhl, Cullen, & Redick, 1997; English & Sales, 1997; Luginbuhl, 1992; 
Ogloff & Rose, 2003; Ogloff, Nadjovski-Terziovski, Spivak, & Clough, 2011; Rose & 
Ogloff, 2001; Severance & Loftus, 1982; Spivak, Ogloff, & Clough, 2011). In the Australian 
forensic context, this problem extends to judicial directions such as Longman, Domican and 
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Alexander directions (Alexander v The Queen (1981); Longman v The Queen (1989); 
Domican v the Queen (1992)) routinely employed in all areas of the criminal law where 
witnesses‟ credibility is at issue. As Coyle and Field (2013) note [at 101] in connection with 
the efficacy of judicial direction in complex areas of psychology:  
 
It is independent of whether or not these directions are framed as obligatory 
directions or as opinions that the jury is free to accept or reject. It requires a 
suspension of disbelief to accept long cherished legal maxims as to the efficacy 
of judicial directions in such circumstances. 
 
Although some studies that have found that using judicial instructions and/or expert 
testimonies caused a response shift in the perceptions that venire jurors commonly have of 
eyewitness identification and rape (Cutler, Dexter and Penrod, 1989) these results are not 
unequivocal. To amplify this point, Ellison & Munro (2009) found that such education did not 
dispel the stereotype that genuine rape victims always fight back. Considering the manifest 
problems identified in jurors comprehending judicial directions it is stretching a long bow to 
argue that such direction can be expected to cause a significant response shift in jurors‟ 
perceptions. However there are, to the author‟s knowledge, no studies on the efficacy of 
judicial instructions and expert evidence vis-à-vis sensitising jurors to the behavioural cues 
that are diagnostic of deception and truth telling. 
 
One way of considering this problem is to ask a very simple question: does education of 
venire jurors, such as may be practically obtained via judicial direction and/or expert 
testimony during the conduct of case, change their perceptions as to what behavioural indicia 
of deception/truth telling discriminate between liars and truth tellers? After all, if this does not 
change perceptions of what does and does not work, which is seriously flawed in virtually all 
venire jurors, then there is simply no point in bothering about the ultimate effect of mooted 
judicial directions and/or expert testimony on their assessments of credibility of witnesses. 
This question was the focus of this study. 
  
METHOD 
Participants, who remained anonymous, were attracted by advertising and a snowballing 
technique and were paid $50 to participate. They were a mixture of the general public and 
university undergraduates/graduates. The participants‟ pre-conceptions about which indicia of 
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truth telling or deception are, or are not indicative of deception, was determined by a 
questionnaire (see Appendix 1), which measured their baseline knowledge vis-à-vis 
diagnostic behavioural indicia of deception. The questionnaire contained items that extensive 
research has demonstrated to be diagnostic and not diagnostic of deception. The order of 
presentation of the questionnaire items was randomised, to prevent participants from 
deducing which behaviours are diagnostic of deception and which behaviours are not. To 
prevent response set bias, the verbal anchors of the Likert scales were randomly presented in 
increasing or decreasing numerical order. Verbal anchors were paired with each number in the 
six-point Likert scale employed. A six-point Likert scale was employed so as to enable 
comparisons with the mean.  
 
The participants were randomly assigned to one of three experimental conditions: JR1- JR3. 
In JR1, after completing the baseline questionnaire (Q1), the participants read what they were 
informed were a judge‟s directions to a jury (see Appendix 2). They then completed the 
questionnaire again (Q2). In JR2, the participants, after completing Q1, saw a short DVD (10 
minutes duration) of an expert giving video-link evidence on behavioural indicia that are 
diagnostic of deception before completing Q2. The “evidence” given therein mirrored the 
information contained in the “judge‟s direction to the jury” utilised in JR1.  JR3 was the same 
as JR2, with the exception that, after seeing the DVD, participants also saw an extract from a 
DVD where an expert witness was being cross-examined. The participants in JR3 were not 
asked to make a credibility assessment of the witness (who was lying): the second DVD was 
simply there to provide a context in which they could consider the initial DVD. Both the 
DVD‟s were taped in courtrooms and both experts were full professors in forensic psychology 




Determining whether two or more groups, of whatever type, truly are different or if the 
difference is merely due to some random event is a common problem. Suppose, for example, 
that one wished to test the hypothesis that all humans born with hands had five fingers. The 
only way this could be completely proven would be to observe every human on the planet. 
However one could disprove the opposite, or null, hypothesis, to a specific degree of certainty 
or probability, by observing a sufficiently large sample of humans, which would then infer 
that the original hypothesis was correct. The degree of certainty in such a process is never 
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absolute; it may approach a probability of p=1.0 (i.e. 100%) but it can never obtain this level 
of certainty unless all members of a class (in these case humans) are observed. This example 
is not far-fetched or fanciful since polydactyly (having more than five digits on either hand or 
foot) clearly exists, albeit it is rare.   
 
Thus, inferential statistical tests enable the probability that a difference between groups is due 
to some casual factor rather than mere chance variation to be inferred. This procedure was 
used in the Matched Pair analysis where the effects of the various education/training were 
measured on the same individuals. In other words, the probability that the difference in the 
same group of participants‟ perceptions of what behavioural indicia of depiction discriminate 
between liars and which do not was due to a real effect and not chance was determined. By 
convention, a result is statistically significant if the probability of it occurring by chance is a 
minimum of p <0.05. That is, this result will only occur by chance less than 5% of the time 
and so there is at least a 95% probability that the results actually reflect a true underlying 
difference. The lower the statistical significance level, the higher the probability that the 
difference is real. 
 
Factor Analysis involves a totally different concept. Factor analysis seeks to discover simple 
patterns in the pattern of relationships among variables, in the case of this study individual 
questionnaire items. More specifically, it seeks to discover if the observed variables can be 
explained largely or entirely in terms of a much smaller number of variables called factors. 
Thus rather than trying to consider differences between all 31 questionnaire items in this 
study, Factor Analysis seeks to identify a much smaller number of underlying factors in the 
individual questionnaire items that “go together” in a mathematical sense.  
 
A perfect Factor Analysis solution would account for all the variability (i.e. variance) in the 
sample of things studied (in this case questionnaire items) but this almost never happens. In 
practice, there are usually a small number of factors that account for the majority of the 
variance with the rest being almost completely meaningless in real terms. The higher the 
proportion of variance accounted for by any particular factor the more important it is in what 
might be called “explanatory power.” This explanatory power is maximized, in a 
mathematical sense, in the final “rotated factor pattern.” 
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The importance of each questionnaire item on any particular factor is determined from the 
final factor pattern with correlations ranging from 0.3 (by convention, any correlation below 
this was considered to be too small to be important and was discarded from the final analysis) 
up to a theoretical maximum of 1. It is important to note that the higher the correlation 
coefficient the bigger the contribution of any specific item to any specific factor. To the extent 
that different patterns of factors are identified, particularly with respect to the number of items 
indicative of deception contributing to (loading on in mathematical terms) factors as a result 
of the education/training the participants received, this would provide support for the notion 
that such training was effective. Such a result would also confirm the result of the Matched 
Pair analysis.  
 
Demographics 
A total of 98 valid questionnaires were completed: one was rejected, as some questionnaire 
items were not coded. Demographic statistics are shown in Table 1. 
 
Table 1 – Demographic Information 
 Age Sex                    Education 
Mean s.d.
a 
Male Female High school 
qualifications 
Completed or partially 
completed university 
studies 
Total of all 
groups 
33.76 15.04 42.7% 57.3% 41.8% 58.2% 
JR1 (n=31) 26.74 9.75 48.4% 51.6% 25.8% 74.2% 
JR2 (n=30) 31.87 14.68 43.3% 56.7% 46.7% 53.3% 
JR3 (n=37) 30.24 11.65 40% 60% 51.4% 48.6% 
a. Standard Deviation. 
 
Matched Pair Analysis 
For some questionnaire items, low scores were indicative of deception (items 14, 28 and 30). 
Scores on these items were transformed prior to analysis so that higher scores were always 
indicative of deception (i.e. 1 was transformed to 6, 2 to 5 etc.). The scores on items 
indicative of deception (item numbers: 2, 3, 6, 11, 14, 17, 19, 21, 25, 28, 29 & 30) were 
summed for each participant and Wilcoxon Signed Tests were conducted to determine 
whether the mean scores on items indicative of deception diverged between Q1 and Q2 for all 
three experimental groups. One-tailed tests were employed as differences were only to be 
expected in increased scores on items indicative of deception. For JR1, the mean score 
(rounded) of summed items indicative of deception on Q1 and Q2 was 3.034 and 3.634 
 20 
respectively (mean difference=0.598, standard error=0.175); S= 141.50, p<0.001  (one tailed). 
For JR2, the mean score (rounded) of summed items indicative of deception on Q1 and Q2 
was 3.345 and 3.62 respectively (mean difference=0.275, standard error=0.130); S= 76.0, 
p<0.04 (one tailed). For JR3, the mean score (rounded) of summed items indicative of 
deception on Q1 and Q2 was 3.316 and 3.753 respectively (mean difference=0.437, standard 
error=0.091); S=235.50, p<0.001  (one tailed). 
 
Factor Analysis 
The pre-intervention questionnaire (Q1) and post-intervention questionnaire (Q2) were 
analysed using Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) Maximum Likelihood Factor Analysis with 
Varimax Rotation, employing Kaiser normalisation, using the SAS statistical programme. In 
this analysis the three experimental groups (JR1-JR3) were collapsed. Prior to final rotation 
individual items loading less than 0.3 on any factor were discarded. The individual items 
loading on the final rotated factor solutions for Q1 and Q2 are set out in Tables 1 and 2: items 
indicative of deception (either by their presence or absence) are indicated by shading.  
 
KMO Measures of Sampling Adequacy for Q1 and Q2 were 0.728 (Approximate Chi-
square=1,308.475) and 0.859 (Approximate Chi-square=1,703.22) respectively. Bartlett‟s test 
for Sphericity was significant for Q1 (df, 465, significance <0.000) and Q2 (df, significance < 
0.000). These results strongly support the validity of factor analysis. Tables 2 and 3 set out the 
rotated factor matrices for Q1 and Q2. The order of presentation of the items loading on 
factors has been standardised to enable ease of comparison.  
 
For Q1, 9 factors, accounting for 53.71%, of the variance were identified. For Q2, 6 factors, 
accounting for 54.12%, of the variance were identified. No statistical test was employed to 
determine whether the factor patterns diverged, as none was considered appropriate. Either 
the factor patterns are identical or they are not: they are not. As can be seen from inspection 
of Tables 2 and 3, the number of items indicative of deception loading on Factor 1 in Q1 and 
Q2 was 4/12 and 9/12 respectively. Further, in Factor 1, in Q2 accounted for approximately 











a. Rotation converged in 24 iterations. Shaded items are indicative of deception. Variance 
accounted for (rounded): Factor 1=10.24%, Factor 2=7.7%, Factor 3=7.6%, Factor 
4=7.4%, Factor 5=5.1%, Factor 6=5.1%, Factor 7= 4.6%, Factor 8=4.0%, Factor 9= 2.1%. 
















   
Delayed responses .307 
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High pitched voice 
  
 




      
Implausible responses .378 .407 .458 
     .626 
Lacks logical structure .413 
 
.537 




   .368   
Responses - few details .626 
 
.471 
      
Responses- many details 
  
 








 .441     
Anxious Behaviour .663 .422  








      
Covering the mouth 
 .906  
      
Crossed Arms 
  
 .421 .459 








 .554     
Interrupting the questioner .335 
 
 
    .472  
Mumbling 
 .665  
      
Nervous behaviour .675 
 
 








  .669    
Restless behaviour .336 
 
 




     
Self-manipulators/scratch 
 .353  .445 
 .319    
Speech disturbances .432 .300  




      
Tenseness .596   
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Table 3 – Q2 Rotated Factor Matrix a 
 
 Factor 
1 2 3 4 5 6 





   
.562 
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Responses - many details 
   
.522   
  
Spontaneous corrections      .471 
     .347  
  









     .558   
  
Confidence 
       .484  
  





     .678   
  
Fidgeting      .332     .307      .446       .644 
 
Gaze aversion      .418     .389      .426  
  
Interrupting the questioner      .348 
      .435  
  
Mumbling      .612 
      .446  
  
Nervous behaviour        .347  
  
Pressed lips 
     .609        .376 
 
Repetition of words/phrases     .338 
      .438  
  
Restless behaviour     .552     .394      .327  
     .468 
Self-grooming 
       .569  
  
Self-manipulators/scratch  
    .506      .444 
 
  
Speech disturbances     .369       .350 .568 
  




Tenseness     .455     .541      .378  
  
 
a. Rotation converged in 7 iterations. Shaded are indicative of deception. Variance 
accounted for (rounded): Factor 1=21.60%, Factor 2=11.98%, Factor 3=8.91%, Factor 







This study provides support for the proposition that information provided to jurors either by 
way of judicial directions or by way of expert evidence can correct venire juror‟s well-
entrenched misconceptions of which behavioural indicia are indicative of deception. This was 
unexpected since it was hypothesised that judicial directions would not have the same effect 
as the presentation of oral expert evidence. Conversely, the finding that oral expert evidence 
in conjunction with a context in which to consider such evidence resulted in a more 
pronounced main effect than all other groups was expected. What might explain these 
findings?  
 
First, the judicial directions were provided in written format and took less time to read than it 
did for participants in the other two experimental groups to listen to oral expert evidence 
covering the same main points.  Conceivably, this could have resulted in less decay of 
memory for the group provided with written directions. Of course, the group with the greatest 
time between exposure to oral expert evidence and completing the post-intervention 
questionnaire was the group who also saw the additional DVD (JR3). However, apart from 
providing context for them in which to consider the expert oral evidence they had viewed, this 
also provided them with the opportunity of rehearsing this information. Thus, the effects of 
decay would have been countervailed by rehearsal, albeit that such rehearsal may not have 
been deliberate. Second, the written directions were incorporated in a document comprising 
the baseline and follow up questionnaires. Although instructions were given, both in the 
questionnaire and orally by the supervising research assistants, to turn the page after all 
participants had completed the baseline questionnaire it is possible that some participants 
used these instructions to check their answers (i.e. they cribbed from them) when completing 
the second questionnaire. Third, there is some evidence from related research into the efficacy 
of judicial directions, that written judicial directions twice as effective as oral directions 
(Thomas, 2010). Assuming that this research is directly applicable to the current study this is 
of some note.  
 
The factors derived in the rotated factor matrix are not amendable to categorical reduction 
insofar as verbal descriptors of these factors are not obvious. Further, to the author‟s 
knowledge no one has employed this technique in studies on deception and therefore the final 
rotated factor matrix should be regarded as exploratory. That said, the results of the factor 
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analysis show that the information participants in this study received resulted in a very 
significant increase in those items indicative of depiction loading of Factor 1 in the post-
intervention questionnaire (Q2), compared to the baseline questionnaire (Q1). Thus, to 
reiterate, considering Factor 1, for Q1 and Q2, the number of items indicative of deception 
loading on this factor included 4/12 items indicative of deception in Q1 and 9/12 items 
indicative of deception in Q2. Further, in Q2, Factor 1 accounted for double the variance of 
Factor I in Q2. The robustness of these results was unexpected. The factor analysis results 
further support the proposition that education, either by way of judicial directions and/or 
expert evidence as to which factors are indicative of deception can cause a major shift in 
perceptions of what works and what doesn‟t work vis-à-vis behavioural indicia of deception. 
By way of elaboration, the greatly increased proportion of questionnaire items that are 
indicative of deception loading on, or contributing to, the most important factor in Q2 (Factor 
1) can only be realistically explained as being due to the exposure of participants to 
information as to what works and what doesn‟t work in detecting deception on the basis of 
behavioural indicia. The fact that other questionnaire items not indicative of deception also 
loaded on Factor 1 serves to confirm that stereotypes are hard to overcome. Nonetheless, this 
result demonstrates that considerable progress can be made in overcoming incorrect 
stereotypes on deception in a manner that could be practically employed in court. Indeed, it 
may be that not overloading venire jurors with too much information was partly responsible 
for the significant and positive shift, in the sense that they were more likely to be accurate, in 
their perceptions of the efficacy of various behavioural indicia in detecting deception. 
 
Lack of knowledge of the behavioural indicia that discriminates between liars and truth tellers 
is not the only obstacle that interferes with the ability of decision makers when assessing the 
credibility of witnesses. Considering the pervasive effects of cognitive heuristics on decision-
making, it has been proposed that triers of fact may disregard education/training/judicial 
directions due to their tendency to adhere to their initial hypotheses (Porter & ten Brinke, 
2009). Even worse, there is some evidence that triers of fact, as a group, often make 
judgments very early in a trial based on inaccurate perceptions of what constitutes indicia of 
truthfulness/deception (Porter & ten Brinke, 2009. This has been referred to as Dangerous 
Decisions Theory. Partly as a result of the well-established concept of cognitive dissonance 
(Festinger, 1957), triers of fact are resistant to changing their initial judgment – even in the 
face of clear evidence to the contrary.  
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These arguments raise a number of issues. First, there is the practical consideration as to 
whether or not the results of this study would apply to the final credibility judgments of 
decision makers. If Dangerous Decisions Theory is indeed correct, and the jury is still out on 
this, then the answer is clear: no. Yet, if this is the case, there is simply no point in trying to 
adduce expert evidence on detection of deception expert evidence since it won‟t make any 
difference because of the way trials are conducted in an adversarial system. By way of 
explanation, by the time the defence could adduce expert evidence on detection of deception, 
the triers of fact would have already made up their minds according to Dangerous Decisions 
Theory and thus there would be no point bothering. This is not only a counsel of despair but it 
also runs counter to the entire basis on which jury trials are conducted.  
 
Second, the problem that changes in behavioural indicia indicative of deception are best 
measured by reference to the baseline performance for any particular person is well nigh 
intractable in the context of an actual trial. This study shows that venire juror‟s perceptions of 
behavioural indicia discriminating between liars and truth tellers can be very significantly 
improved, but whether this will result in an increased accuracy in detecting liars in the 
absence of knowledge of the usual behavioural presentation of witnesses is another thing. 
That said, a number of studies have shown that increased deception accuracy is certainly 
possible in the absence of significant knowledge of individuals‟ usual behavioural 
mannerisms (Porter, McCabe, Woodworth & Pearce, 2007; Porter, Juodis, ten Brinke, Klein 
& Peace, 2010). Further, some clues can be gleaned from this study that support the 
proposition that increased credibility assessments are likely to flow from increasing the 
knowledge of venire jurors, irrespective of lacking knowledge of a witnesses‟ usual 
presentation of behavioural indicia indicative of truth telling and deception. The fact that 
ambivalent responses, spontaneous corrections and short responses loaded on Factor 1 in Q2 
but not in Q1 is of some note in this regard, since assessment of these items does not require 
significant, or even any knowledge, of individuals‟ baseline behaviour. Similarly, the fact 
there was a significant increase in the loading of questionnaire items dealing with responses 
with few details and responses that lack logical structure on Factor 1 in Q2 relative to Q1 may 
be interpreted in the same way. That is, observation of these behavioural responses does not 
require significant knowledge of individuals‟ baseline behaviour, if at all. Whichever way one 
looks at the results of this study, they clearly support the contention that adducing expert 
evidence and ensuring that judicial directions based on scientific fact as to what works and 
 26 
what doesn‟t work in detecting deception are provided to jurors can only be a great advance 
on the current state of affairs. 
 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
Having regard to uncontested findings in the literature on detection of deception some of the 
problems confronting decision makers in assessing witness credibility are beyond doubt. The 
following are recommended: - 
 Considering the vagaries of courtroom design and the utter impossibility of 
decision makers being able to accurately assess some behavioural indicia in the 
overwhelming majority of courtrooms, it is apparent that this needs to be 
remedied. Having CCTV footage of witnesses that can be displayed from both a 
wide angle and close-up perspective on large format television screens can do this.  
This should be mandatory in all courts so that the triers of fact have the capacity to 
closely observe a range of behavioural indicia of witnesses. 
 Since misleading, if not demonstrably wrong guidance to judges, as may be found 
in the Queensland Supreme Court Equal Treatment Benchbook for example, is 
based on a misunderstanding of the science on which it is ostensibly founded such 
guidance should be rewritten in accordance with uncontested psychological fact. 
 The issue of witness credibility is not confined to behavioural indicia that can be 
observed in the courtroom. It may be founded in numerous aspects of the 
investigatory phase of the legal process (Coyle & Field, 2013) and thus continuing 
dialogue between lawyers and psychologists, as McClellan J (2006), among 
others, has called for is essential. Continuing legal education on the interaction 
between psychology and law is clearly essential.  
 
As far as the experimental results reported herein are concerned the following are 
recommended: - 
 This study needs to be replicated, preferably with venire jurors who can view 
actual witnesses in mock trials, or, preferably, actual trials and make final 
credibility assessments after listening to expert evidence and receiving appropriate 
judicial direction. The latter option will require revisiting the long-standing 
reluctance to allow videorecording of trials in Australia and allow such recordings 
to be used for research purposes. There is no reason why appropriate safeguards 
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could not be put in place to ensure that such videorecording did not interfere with 
the administration of justice. Removing the barriers to post-polling of jurors for 
the purpose of research would enable questions about witness credibility that can 
only be inferred at present to be precisely explicated. Although some may regard 
this as a bridge by far, previously unthinkable steps (such as pre-polling of jurors 
to exclude those who are irretrievably biased – see R v Patel QSC (2013, 
unreported)) have found their way into the courts in Australia.  
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2. See, generally: Field, D. Queensland Evidence Law, 2
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 Edition, LexisNexis Butterworths 
Chatswood. At p. 159 it is noted that: - “It is sometimes difficult to determine what is and 
what is not a matter going solely to the witness‟s credit.”  Field cites R v Hitchcock (1847) 
154 ER 38 where it was affirmed that an issue “is not collateral if, as part of the case for the 
cross-examining party, it could be proved.” 
3. These operate as exceptions to what is generally termed the “collateral evidence rule” both 
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Appendix 1: Questionnaire  
This questionnaire was based on one developed as part of a B.A. (Hons.) thesis by Melissa 
Toh at Macquarie University where the author was a co-supervisor. 
 
Instructions: 
You are asked to indicate what factors you think would enable you to determine whether 
someone is truthful if they were giving evidence in a court case. Circle the number that best 
describes how you feel. If you make a mistake, put a cross through the circle and circle 
the appropriate number. There are no correct answers; we are merely seeking your opinion  
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10. Self-manipulators i.e. hand movements that involve relieving a bodily need like 
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Appendix 2: Judicial Directions 
Your Honour: Members of the jury. You have heard the various evidence in this case. 
While the weight that you give to the views is, of course, a matter for you I am going to talk 
to you, in a general sense, about the weight that may be given to the evidence. You should 
consider the demeanor of the witnesses in addition to what they had to say in response to 
questions asked of them. That is, you should consider the way and manner in which the 
witness gave evidence in addition to what they said.  
 
I now isolate and identify for your benefit, the following matters of significance, particularly 
with regards to demeanor, which the Courts generally recognise. 
 Liars tend to speak in a higher pitch relative to their normal speaking voice when they 
are telling the truth. 
 Liars make fewer movements with their hands, arms and fingers. 
 Liars use fewer illustrators (hand and arm movements to demonstrate and illustrate 
points they are making). 
 Liars take longer pauses. 
 Liars‟ answers are less plausible. 
 Liars‟ stories contain fewer details. 
 Liars give more indirect answers. 
 Liars‟ answers contain less temporal, perceptual and spatial information. 
 
The presence or absence of some or all of these factors might reasonably, depending of course 
on your own view, be regarded as undermining the reliability of the evidence of the witnesses. 
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